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The Effect of Compensation Committee Quality on the Association
between CEO Cash Compensation and Accounting Performance

ABSTRACT
Manuscript Type: Empirical
Research Question/Issue: We examine the effect of compensation committee quality on
the association between CEO cash compensation and accounting earnings and the
moderating effects of growth opportunities and earnings status.
Research Findings/Insights: Using a sample of 812 U.S. firms, we find that CEO cash
compensation is more positively associated with accounting earnings when firms have
high compensation committee quality. We also find that the positive effect of
compensation committee quality on the association between CEO cash compensation and
accounting earnings is less for high growth firms or loss-making firms.
Theoretical/Academic Implications: We contribute to the agency based research on
CEO compensation by (1) directly examining the impact of compensation committee
quality on the sensitivity of CEO cash compensation to accounting earnings, (2)
examining whether the role of compensation committee quality varies across firms, and
(3) developing a broader and richer measure of compensation committee quality.
Practitioner/Policy Implications: Our findings imply that shareholders and directors
should be concerned about the composition of compensation committees as we find that
compensation committee quality varies depending on compensation committee size and
other characteristics of the committee members. Our findings also imply that for
compensation committee members, there are greater challenges in monitoring CEO
compensation contracts for firms with high growth or that incur losses. Further, our
findings imply that even when all compensation committees are regulated to be fully
independent, there are still quality differences among these independent compensation
committees.
Keywords: Corporate governance, compensation committee, pay-performance sensitivity
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INTRODUCTION
Several prior studies have examined the effect of compensation committee quality on the
association between CEO pay and firm performance where compensation committee
quality is measured by compensation committee independence (e.g., the proportion of
independent directors on the compensation committee). However, the evidence has been
mixed. For example, Anderson and Bizjak (2003) do not find that less independent
compensation committees have a lower association between CEO pay and stock returns.
On the other hand, Newman and Mozes (1999) find that the association between
compensation and stock returns is significantly higher for firms with independent
compensation committees when stock returns are negative. Vafeas (2003a) finds that the
pay-performance sensitivity for firms with less independent compensation committees
improved in the wake of two major regulatory reforms – i.e., the 1992 SEC compensation
disclosure rules and the 1993 tax limits on certain executive compensation (i.e., Internal
Revenue Code Section 162(m)).1
One explanation for the mixed findings is that the proportion of independent
directors is an incomplete measure of compensation committee quality. First, we expect
that compensation committee quality would be better measured using a broader and
richer set of variables related to the structure and composition of the compensation
committee. Second, as a practical matter, compensation committee independence is no
longer a relevant measure of compensation committee quality because U.S. listing rules
(i.e., NYSE Corporate Governance 303A.05, NASDAQ Rule 4350(c), AMEX Enhanced
Corporate Governance Rules Sec. 805) now require that compensation committees be
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composed entirely of independent directors. Thus, under the current listing rules, all
compensation committees would be classified as independent, but we expect that there
will be quality differences among these independent compensation committees.
The first purpose of this study is to examine whether CEO cash compensation and
accounting performance are more closely aligned when compensation committee quality
is high. If higher quality compensation committees are better at linking pay to
accounting performance, we expect that the interaction between compensation committee
quality and accounting performance will be positively related to CEO cash compensation.
We focus on cash compensation because similar to Dechow, Huson, and Sloan (1994),
Gaver and Gaver (1998), Adut, Cready, and Lopez (2003), Comprix and Mueller (2006),
Leone, Wu, and Zimmerman (2006), and others, we are interested in the reward piece of
total compensation. That is, the cash piece can be viewed as ex-post compensation that
depends on past and current performance while the incentive component (stock pricebased compensation) depends on future performance.
To test this hypothesis, we construct a multidimensional measure of compensation
committee quality choosing from six potential, individual measures of compensation
committee quality including the proportion of CEO appointed directors on the committee,
the proportion of committee members with 20 or more years of board service time, the
proportion of directors who are CEOs of other firms, the proportion of directors who
serve on three or more boards, the percentage of shares held by directors on the
compensation committee, and the size of the committee. Using a sample of 812 U.S.
listed companies with fully independent compensation committees, we find evidence that
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CEO cash compensation is more positively associated with accounting earnings for firms
with high compensation committee governance quality than for firms with low
compensation committee governance quality.
The second purpose of this study is to examine whether the extent to which the
association between CEO cash compensation and accounting earnings reflects
compensation committee quality is affected by growth opportunities and earnings status.
We are interested in the moderating effect of growth opportunities because stock option
grants play a more important role in incentivizing managers for high growth firms than
for low growth firms. Also, since losses are less informative about future firm
performance than profits, we also examine whether losses reduce the effect of
compensation committee quality on the association between CEO cash compensation and
accounting earnings. Consistent with our hypotheses, we document that the positive
effect of compensation committee quality on the association between CEO cash
compensation and accounting earnings is less for high growth firms and loss-making
firms than for low growth firms and profit-making firms.
This study contributes to the literature in the following ways. First, our study
extends the research on the effect of compensation committee quality on the relation
between compensation and firm performance. A number of prior studies suggest that
compensation committees have an important role in linking accounting performance to
CEO cash compensation (e.g., Dechow, Huson, and Sloan, 1994; Gaver and Gaver, 1998;
Comprix and Mueller, 2006), but none of these studies have examined the role of
compensation committees directly, i.e., none of them include a measure of compensation
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committee quality in their tests. In contrast, compensation committee quality is the
central focus of our tests. Unlike extant studies that focus on compensation committee
independence (e.g., Anderson and Bizjak, 2003; Newman and Mozes, 1999; Vafeas,
2003a), we use compensation committee characteristics other than committee
independence to examine the effect of compensation committee quality on the association
between compensation and firm performance.
Second, our study adds to the literature by examining whether the effect of
compensation committee quality on the association between CEO cash compensation and
accounting earnings is related to firm characteristics such as growth opportunities and
earnings status. Our results suggest that the impact of compensation committee quality
on the sensitivity of cash pay to accounting performance will differ cross-sectionally.
Thus, improving compensation committee quality would not have the same effect for all
firms, suggesting that regulating compensation committees could be difficult.
Third, we use a broad-based measure of compensation committee quality. Since
compensation committee independence can no longer be used as a proxy for
compensation committee quality when studying U.S. listed firms (because of the 2003
changes in U.S. listing rules), our measure could be used in future research. Thus, this
study builds a platform for future research on effects of compensation committee quality.

BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESIS
Association between CEO cash compensation and accounting earnings
There is a stream of research on the relation between CEO cash compensation and
accounting earnings. The objective of these studies is to examine how sensitive CEO
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cash compensation is to a change in accounting earnings. Other studies examine whether
all components of accounting earnings are equally weighted in determining CEO cash
compensation or whether certain components play a greater or lesser role.
Based on analytical agency models, Lambert and Larcker (1987) show that CEO
cash compensation is a function of accounting earnings and stock returns.2 They also
find that the optimal compensation contract can be expressed as a linear relation between
compensation and accounting and market measures of performance, which theoretically
guides the empirical specifications of the compensation function. They document strong
evidence that the change in CEO cash compensation exhibits a strong positive relation
with both changes in return on equity and stock returns.
Sloan (1993) investigates the role of accounting earnings in compensation
contracts. He finds that CEO cash compensation is more sensitive to earnings than stock
returns when (1) stock returns have a higher association with market-wide movements in
equity values, (2) earnings have a higher association with firm-specific change in values,
and (3) earnings have a less positive (more negative) association with market-wide
movements in equity values. These results suggest that earnings are more useful in
executive compensation contracts than stock returns in terms of shielding compensation
from market-wide fluctuations in equity values that are beyond managers’ control.
Prior research also suggests that compensation committees may act in the interest
of the CEO in using accounting performance to set cash compensation. Defeo, Lambert,
and Larcker (1989) examine the relation between the earnings effects of equity-for-debt
swaps and changes in executive compensation. They find that cash compensation
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increases with an increase in accounting earnings generated by the swap transactions. An
advantage of using swap transactions is that the stock market negatively reacts to these
transactions although they increase earnings, indicating that these transactions would not
signal good news about shareholders’ wealth. Thus, their study suggests that it might be
more likely that managers opportunistically use swap transactions to increase their pay
and that compensation committees might act in the managers’ interests.
Dechow, Huson, and Sloan (1994) examine whether compensation committees
shield executive compensation from restructuring charges which increase share value but
decrease reported earnings. They find that large (small) restructuring charges are
associated with higher (lower) CEO cash compensation, which means that CEO’s cash
compensation is not penalized for large restructuring expenses. The results suggest that
compensation committees actively intervene in setting compensation in a way which is in
the interests of CEOs. Gaver and Gaver (1998) investigate the effect of above the line
earnings (i.e., earnings before extraordinary items and the results of discontinued
operations) and below the line earnings on CEO cash compensation. They find that CEO
cash compensation is positively associated with above the line earnings as long as
earnings are positive, but the significant association between compensation and above the
line earnings is nullified when earnings are negative, suggesting that compensation
committees are using accounting performance measures to favour CEOs.
In summary, prior theoretical and empirical research finds that CEO cash
compensation is positively associated with accounting earnings, suggesting that
accounting performance plays an important role in CEO cash compensation contracts.
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Prior research also suggests that compensation committees may act in the interests of
CEOs in using earnings performance to set cash compensation. However, while these
studies assume that compensation committees play a central role in linking accounting
numbers and CEO pay, none of them has examined the role of compensation committees
directly or considered the impact of compensation committee quality.

Effect of corporate governance on the association between CEO compensation
and firm performance
There are a number of extant studies that examine the effect of corporate governance
quality on the association between CEO compensation and firm performance. However,
those studies provide mixed evidence, suggesting that further investigation is warranted.
For example, Newman and Mozes (1999) examine whether compensation committee
composition affects CEO compensation practices. They find that the relation between
compensation and stock returns is significantly lower for firms whose compensation
committee has at least one insider (i.e., insider-influenced firms) than for firms whose
compensation committee has no insiders (i.e., outsider-influenced firms) when stock
returns are negative. However, they do not find similar evidence for firms that
experience positive stock returns. Thus, their study provides only partial evidence on the
effect of compensation committee composition on the relation between CEO
compensation and stock returns.
Perry and Zenner (2001) investigate whether CEO compensation practices are
affected by tax legislation enacted in 1993, the Internal Revenue Code Section 162(m),
which may enhance the corporate governance quality of compensation committees. They
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document a stronger relationship between compensation and stock returns post-1993, and
find that this relation is more pronounced for firms that are more likely to be affected by
the Internal Revenue Code Section 162(m). However, they find that the effect of the
legislation on the relation between compensation and accounting earnings is not clear, in
that the sensitivity of compensation to contemporaneous earnings decreases but the
sensitivity of compensation to lagged earnings increases post-1993. Overall, their
findings implicitly support the notion that high corporate governance quality increases
the association between CEO compensation and firm performance.
Like Perry and Zenner (2001), Vafeas (2003a) examines the effect of the
regulatory reforms such as the 1992 SEC compensation disclosure rules and the 1993 tax
legislation (i.e., Internal Revenue Code Section 162(m)) on executive compensation
practices. He shows that the pay-performance sensitivity for firms with inside committee
members prior to the regulatory reforms improves after the reforms. Pay practices of
those firms become more similar to pay practices of other firms after the reforms. These
results suggest that the regulatory reforms may improve the governance quality of
compensation committees, thus resulting in a higher sensitivity of CEO compensation to
firm performance.3
Anderson and Bizjak (2003) examine whether compensation committee
independence affects compensation practices. They find no evidence that the fraction of
independent directors on the compensation committee is significantly related to the
sensitivity of the value of new option grants or the full option portfolio to firm
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performance, suggesting that higher compensation committee independence would not
result in a larger magnitude of pay-performance sensitivity.
In summary, Newman and Mozes (1999), Perry and Zenner (2001), and Vafeas
(2003a) find some evidence on the effect of compensation committee quality on the
relation between CEO compensation and firm performance in certain cases. However,
those studies are limited in the following ways. First, they do not elaborately measure
compensation committee independence as Newman and Mozes (1999) only identify
whether the compensation committee is fully independent or not, while Perry and Zenner
(2001) and Vafeas (2003a) do not measure compensation committee independence
directly. Perry and Zenner (2001) and Vafeas (2003a) focus on the change in
compensation committee quality around 1993 when the Internal Revenue Code Section
162(m) was introduced. Their implicit measure of compensation committee
independence is a dummy variable coded “1” for the post-1993 period and “0” for the
pre-1993 period. Second, Newman and Mozes (1999) and Vafeas (2003a) do not use
accounting earnings but only use stock returns as a performance measure. Third, Perry
and Zenner (2001) find inconclusive evidence regarding the relation between accounting
earnings and enhanced compensation committee quality arising from changes in tax
legislation. Further, Anderson and Bizjak (2003) find no evidence that compensation
committee independence affects the association between compensation and firm
performance. Thus, whether compensation committee quality affects the role of
accounting performance in CEO cash compensation remains an open question, and we
contribute to the literature by examining this issue in greater depth.
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Hypotheses
The principal-agent models predict that designing compensation contracts based on
observable and enforceable performance measures including accounting numbers can
align the incentives of the agent with those of the principal (Holmstrom, 1979). Based on
agency theory, Lambert and Larcker (1987) analytically show the existence of a positive
relationship between compensation and accounting performance.
Consistent with the theoretical prediction, empirical studies document strong
evidence that accounting earnings are significantly associated with CEO cash
compensation (e.g., Lambert and Larcker, 1987; Sloan, 1993). Sloan (1993) finds that
CEO cash compensation is more positively related to accounting earnings than stock
returns when stock returns are noisy when measuring managers’ performance. As
indicated above, this suggests that accounting earnings are more useful in compensation
contracts than stock returns to shield compensation from market-wide fluctuations in
equity values that are beyond managers’ control. Based on prior research (e.g., Murphy,
1999), accounting earnings are more likely to be an explicit metric of performance in
cash compensation contracts. If high quality compensation committees are more likely to
set CEO cash compensation based on executives’ performance, then the association
between cash compensation and accounting performance will be higher for firms with
high quality compensation committees.
A concern on using compensation contracts is that without appropriate corporate
governance, CEOs would “appear to write their contracts with one hand and sign them
with other” (Williamson, 1985). Managers can wield their significant influence over the
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compensation committee for rent extraction (e.g., Bebchuk and Fried, 2003; Bebchuk,
Fried, and Walker, 2002). Even if accounting-based performance measures are widely
used in designing bonus plans, the compensation contracts themselves do not represent
the final decisions on paying CEOs. When compensation committees are controlled by
managers, provisions of compensation contracts that are less favourable to managers will
be less likely to be enforced. In this case, compensation committees will not effectively
fulfil their duties.
Prior research suggests that high corporate governance quality can enhance the
monitoring effectiveness of audit committees. For instance, Klein (2002b) finds that high
audit committee independence can constrain earnings management. Carcello and Neal
(2000) document that low audit committee independence increases the likelihood of
auditors not issuing a going-concern report to financially distressed clients.4 Also,
Carcello and Neal (2003) find that audit committees with greater independence and
expertise more effectively protect auditors from dismissal after the issuance of new
going-concern reports. Recently, Chan and Li (2008) find that audit committees with
high governance quality are associated with higher firm value. Bedard, Coulombe, and
Courteau (2008) find that audit committee governance quality is inversely related to the
level of IPO underpricing. Similarly, if high corporate governance quality of
compensation committees can improve the monitoring effectiveness of compensation
committees, then executive compensation contracts will be designed and implemented to
better align the incentives of agents with the interests of principals. Thus, the association
between CEO cash compensation and accounting earnings would be higher for firms with
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high compensation committee quality than for firms with low compensation committee
quality. More formally, we hypothesize:
H1:

CEO cash compensation is more positively associated with accounting earnings

for firms with high compensation committee quality than for firms with low compensation
committee quality.
The extent to which the association between CEO cash compensation and earnings
performance reflects compensation committee quality may be affected by firm
characteristics. CEO cash compensation may play a less important role in incentivizing
managers for firms with high stock option grants. Stock option grants are more important
for high growth firms to ensure managers’ investment decisions maximize firm value.
Prior research documents that firms with high growth opportunities award more stock
options (e.g., Hanlon, Rajgopal, and Shevlin, 2003; Ittner, Lambert, and Larcker, 2003).
Since a significant portion of CEO compensation is stock price-based compensation for
high growth firms, it is likely that those firms’ compensation committee quality cannot be
measured by the association between CEO cash compensation and accounting
performance. Thus, the positive effect of compensation committee quality on the
association between CEO cash compensation and accounting performance would be
affected by growth opportunities. We formulate the second hypothesis as follows:
H2:

The positive effect of compensation committee quality on the association between

CEO cash compensation and accounting earnings is weakened by growth opportunities
confronting the firm.
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The relationship between compensation committee quality and the association
between CEO cash compensation and accounting earnings would be also affected by
firms’ earnings status. Hayn (1995) finds that return-earnings association is less for lossmaking firms than for profit-making firms, suggesting that losses are less informative
about future firm performance than profits. Thus, firms that are more likely to incur
losses may rely on alternative performance measures in setting CEO cash compensation.
If so, CEO cash compensation will be less associated with accounting earnings for those
firms even when compensation committee quality is high. Thus, we develop the third
hypothesis as follows:
H3:

The positive effect of compensation committee quality on the association between

CEO cash compensation and accounting earnings is weakened by loss-making situations
confronting the firm.

RESEARCH DESIGN
Sample selection
We select the sample by first searching the IRRC Directors database for the U.S.
companies with compensation committees consisting solely of independent directors in
2001.5 This step yields a raw sample of 1,225 firms with independent compensation
committees identified by the information of committee memberships and board
affiliations provided by IRRC. We then merge this sample with the Execucomp database
to generate a reduced sample of 925 firms that are covered by both databases. Next, we
check the SEC’s EDGAR database to obtain additional data about compensation
committee members.6 After this filter, we have a sample of 897 firms with data for the
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six compensation committee characteristics discussed in the next section. Finally, we
delete observations without the availability of CEO cash compensation, financial data and
market data that this study needs in Execucomp, Compustat, and CRSP, leaving a final
sample of 812 firms. The industries most widely represented in the final sample are:
manufacturing (47.79%), services (14.41%), transportation, communication, electric, gas,
and sanitary services (10.48%), finance, insurance, and real estate (9.98%), and retail
trade (8.87%).7

Compensation committee characteristics
To develop a comprehensive measure of compensation committee quality, we survey the
existing corporate governance literature and identify six committee characteristics that
could be related to compensation committee quality or effectiveness.8 However, as
discussed below, the ex ante direction of the relations is not always obvious. Thus, as we
describe later, we conduct preliminary analyses to establish the direction of the relations
before constructing a comprehensive measure of compensation committee quality.
The six characteristics that we consider are as follows:
(1) CEO appointed directors – Wade, O’Reilly, and Chandratat (1990) and Daily,
Johnson, Ellstrand, and Dalton (1998) suggest that independent directors who are
appointed during the tenure of the incumbent CEO are more likely to have an
interdependent relationship with the CEO. We define those directors as “CEO appointed
directors”. CEOs are likely to influence the nomination and appointment of independent
directors since CEOs usually serve as chair of the board. As a result, CEO appointed
directors may have closer ties with and be more loyal to the CEO. Thus, an independent
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compensation committee may be less effective if it has more CEO appointed directors.
We use the proportion of CEO appointed directors on the compensation committee as one
measure of compensation committee quality.
(2) Senior directors – Directors with greater board experience are more likely to
provide higher governance quality (e.g., Buchanan, 1974; Salancik, 1977; Vance, 1983;
Vafeas, 2003b). First, senior directors have greater experience, expertise, and
competence, which can enhance their governance quality (Vafeas, 2003b). Vance (1983)
argues that forcing directors to retire can waste talent and experience. Second, directors’
commitment and willingness in doing good jobs may increase in their tenure. Buchanan
(1974) shows that extended tenure can enhance organizational commitment. Salancik
(1977) argues that organizational commitment rises with tenure because seasoned
employees are more likely to have developed confidence and competence in doing their
job. However, Lipton and Lorsch (2002) suggest that directors are likely to usurp CEO’s
functions as tenure increases. Vafeas (2003b) argues that long director tenure may be
detrimental to the interests of shareholders. Thus, senior directors could be less effective
because they are more entrenched. Following Vafeas (2003b), we use the proportion of
directors on the compensation committee with 20 or more years of board service time for
the current company as another measure of compensation committee quality.
(3) CEO directors – Having CEOs of other firms on the compensation committee
can lead to lower governance quality since they may be more likely to support the firm’s
CEO (e.g., Lorsch and MacIver, 1989; Daily, Johnson, Ellstrand, and Dalton, 1998). For
example, CEOs might be sympathetic to each other and will bias their decisions in order
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to assist a fellow CEO. On the other hand, CEO directors could improve governance
quality as they may bring business leadership, experience, and expertise to compensation
committees. As a third individual governance quality measure, we use the proportion of
CEOs of other firms on the compensation committee.
(4) Director shareholdings – Directors’ governance quality may be higher for
directors with high shareholdings as the extent to which interests of directors can be
aligned with those of shareholders is positively associated with directors’ shareholdings
(Shivdasani, 1993; Vafeas, 2003b). High stock ownership increases directors’ incentives
to monitor the CEO (e.g., Shivdasani and Yermack, 1999). Klein (2002a) finds that
earnings management is less for firms with more directors with block shareholdings
sitting on the audit committee. Analogously, a compensation committee with higher
director shareholdings may be more effective in setting and monitoring CEO pay
packages. Of course, it is also possible that directors with excessive shareholdings could
be entrenched (Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1988). Directors with excessive
shareholdings may expropriate minority shareholders, resulting in lower monitoring
quality of those directors. We use the percentage of shares held by directors on the
compensation committee as our fourth measure of compensation committee quality.
(5) Additional directorships - Independent directors that have directorships with
many companies may want to be seen as effective directors in order to maintain their
reputational capital (e.g., Shivdasani and Yermack, 1999). Prior research (e.g., Fama,
1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983; Kaplan and Reishus, 1990; Shivdasani, 1993; Brickley,
Linck, and Coles, 1999; Harford, 2003) provides evidence that directors with more
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additional board appointments will be better monitors of managerial decisions.
Alternatively, many additional directorships may indicate the director is too busy, which
would reduce the effectiveness of their work (Core, Holthausen, and Larcker, 1999; Fich
and Shivdasani, 2006). Thus, the fifth individual governance quality measure is
measured as the proportion of directors with three or more additional board seats on the
compensation committee (Shivdasani, 1993).
(6) Committee size – Smaller compensation committees may have a shortage of
advisors and monitors of management (e.g., Bushman, Chen, Engel, and Smith, 2004).
For example, Agrawal and Knoeber (1999) suggest that larger size boards may play a
more important role in monitoring firms where information is otherwise difficult to
obtain. Adams and Mehran (2002) document that banking firms with larger boards have
better performance than banking firms with smaller boards. Large committees may also
be less easily influenced by the CEO or other top managers in the firm. On the other
hand, Yermack (1996) and Beasley (1996) document that smaller boards perform better
than bigger boards. The higher effectiveness of small boards may result from lower
cooperation costs and less free riding (Jensen, 1993). Thus, it is possible that small
compensation committees could be more effective. We use the number of directors on
the compensation committee as a sixth measure of compensation committee quality.

Composite measure of compensation committee quality
Since the individual compensation committee characteristics may reflect different aspects
of governance quality, we employ a composite score to comprehensively measure the
multiple dimensions of compensation committee quality. Specifically, aggregating the
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individual quality scores can give us a richer representation of compensation committee
quality than any of the individual measures alone. Thus, we compute a composite
measure of compensation committee quality based on the individual measures discussed
above.
However, since the direction of the relation between some individual measures
and governance quality is not always clear (e.g., a large board could be effective or
ineffective), we first estimate eq. (2) for each individual measure to establish its quality
direction. For each individual measure, we define a quality score that is coded “1” if the
firm’s value of that measure is greater (less) than the median of that measure where the
individual measure increases (decreases) in governance quality, and “0” otherwise. The
composite measure is the sum of the quality scores of the individual measures for the
firm where a higher (lower) sum indicates more effective (ineffective) compensation
committees. We label the composite measure as CCQUAL.

Variables
Following Leone, Wu, and Zimmerman (2006), we use the total cash compensation, e.g.,
the sum of bonus and salary, as the measure of CEO cash compensation. The total cash
compensation is a better proxy for CEO cash compensation than its component, i.e.,
either bonus or salary, because some companies may not have bonus plans but may adjust
CEO salary to compensate the CEO. Like prior research (e.g., Lambert and Larcker,
1987), we take the log of cash compensation as the dependent variable. There are at least
two advantages of taking a log transformation of cash compensation. First, it is more
likely that the dependent variable has a normal distribution, which is assumed by the
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regression analysis. Second, the log transformation can reduce the difference in the
magnitude of compensation across firms. Thus, it may mitigate the effect of
heteroscedascity which can be an econometric issue when the cross-sectional regression
analysis is performed.
This study uses the following independent variables in the main tests. Return on
equity (ROE) is measured by income before extraordinary items divided by the
beginning-year shareholders’ equity. Stock returns (RET) are measured by the buy-hold
returns based on monthly returns for a fiscal year. CCQUAL is the composite measure of
compensation committee quality as explained above. Growth opportunities (lnMB) are
measured by the log of the sum of book value of liabilities and market value of common
equity over book value of assets. Loss-making dummy (LOSS) is coded “1” for lossmaking firms and “0” otherwise.
This study also uses the following variables in the additional analyses. Return on
assets (ROA) is measured by income before extraordinary items divided by the
beginning-year total assets. Sales (SALES) are measured by the log value of net sales.
Leverage (LEV) is measured by the debt-to-assets ratio. Prior year’s cash compensation
(ln(COMP-1) is measured as the log value of prior year’s CEO salary plus bonus. CEO
ownership (CEOOWN) is measured by the percentage of shares owned by the CEO.
CEO tenure (CEOTEN) is measured by the number of years for which the incumbent
CEO has been the CEO of the firm. Institutional shareholding (INSHD) is measured by
the percentage of shares owned by institutional investors. Firm size (FSIZE) is measured
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by the log of total assets. CCQUALRANK is coded “0”, “1” or “2” based on portfolio
rank when sorted by CCQUAL.

Models
Based on the theoretical specification of the relation between compensation and
performance measures developed by Lambert and Larcker (1987), this study first
examines the association between CEO cash compensation and accounting earnings using
the following model:
∆ln(COMP) = β0 + β1 ∆ROE+ β2 RET + industry dummies

(1)

We also add the dummy variables for each two-digit SIC industry which has at least 10
firms in the sample to control for the fixed industry effects. Based on prior research, the
coefficient β1 and β2 in model (1) are expected to be positive and significant.
To test H1, we include CCQUAL and the interaction of CCQUAL with ∆ROE in
model (1) to generate the following model:
∆ln(COMP) = γ0 + γ1 CCQUAL + γ2 ∆ROE + γ3CCQUAL*∆ROE
+ γ4 RET + industry dummies

(2)

If CEO cash compensation is more positively associated with accounting earnings for
firms with high compensation committee governance quality than for firms with low
compensation committee governance quality, then the coefficient γ3 will be positive and
significant.
To test H2 and H3, model (2) is expanded by including lnMB and LOSS and their
interactions with ∆ROE and RCQUAL*∆ROE as follows:
∆ln(COMP) = γ0 + γ1 CCQUAL + γ2 ∆ROE + γ3CCQUAL*∆ROE
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+ γ4 RET + γ5 lnMB + γ6 lnMB*∆ROE+ γ7 lnMB*CCQUAL*∆ROE
+ γ8 LOSS + γ9 LOSS*∆ROE+ γ10 LOSS*CCQUAL*∆ROE
+ industry dummies

(3)

If the effect of compensation committee quality on the association between CEO cash
compensation and accounting earnings is less positive for high growth firms and lossmaking firms than for low growth firms and profit-making firms, respectively, then the
coefficients γ7 and γ10 will be negative and significant.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Table 1 provides evidence on the role of accounting earnings in CEO cash compensation.
We find that CEO cash compensation is significantly positively associated with
accounting performance and market performance (t = 6.69, p < .001 and
t = 6.45, p < .001, respectively), consistent with the findings in previous studies (e.g.,
Lambert and Larcker, 1987).
Take in Table 1
Table 2 presents the results on examining the effect of compensation committee
governance quality on the association between CEO cash compensation and accounting
earnings when governance quality is measured by each compensation committee
characteristic, i.e., CEO appointed directors, senior directors, CEO directors, director
shareholdings, additional directorships, and committee size. The results show that CEO
cash compensation is more positively associated with accounting earnings for firms with
a lower proportion of directors appointed during the tenure of the incumbent CEO sitting
on compensation committees (t = -1.57, p < .10), suggesting that CEO appointed
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directors may have lower governance quality. We also find strong evidence that CEO
cash compensation is more positively associated with accounting earnings for firms with
a higher proportion of senior directors sitting on compensation committees (t = 3.28,
p < .01), suggesting that senior directors have higher governance quality.
Take in Table 2
We find the association between CEO cash compensation and accounting earnings
is higher when firms have a high proportion of directors on the compensation committee
who are CEOs of other firms ( t = 1.90, p < .05), consistent with the argument that CEO
directors may bring business leadership, experience and expertise to compensation
committees, thus improving governance quality. However, Table 2 reports no significant
effect of director shareholdings on the compensation committee on the association
between CEO cash compensation and accounting earnings.
Moreover, we find that the association between CEO cash compensation and
accounting earnings is significantly higher for firms with a higher proportion of directors
with three or more additional directorships sitting on compensation committees (t = 2.37,
p < .01), suggesting that directors with more additional directorships may have higher
governance quality. We also find that the association between CEO cash compensation
and accounting earnings is lower when firms have a larger compensation committee
(t = -1.40, p < .10), consistent with the notion that committee governance quality is
negatively associated with committee size although the evidence is marginally
significant.
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Table 3, panel A provides the descriptive statistics for the variables in the
regression analysis. Based on the results in Table 2, we exclude director shareholdings
from the six compensation committee characteristics as its effect on the association
between CEO cash compensation and accounting earnings is insignificant. Next, we
compute the overall quality measure (i.e., CCQUAL in Table 3) by aggregating the
governance quality scores of the five individual measures. The individual measures of
CEO appointed directors and committee size are multiplied by -1 so that these two
measures are increasing in governance quality when they are used in constructing the
composite measure. The mean and median for CCQUAL are 2.08 and 2.00. Thus, the
average compensation committee would have high quality scores for about two of the
five individual governance quality measures. Table 3, panel B presents the Pearson
correlation coefficients between the independent variables. CCQUAL is not significantly
correlated with ∆ROE and is marginally negatively correlated with RET, while ∆ROE is
positively correlated with RET (r = 0.31, p < .001).
Take in Table 3
Table 4 presents evidence on the effect of overall compensation committee
quality on the association between CEO cash compensation and accounting earnings and
the moderating effects of growth opportunities and earnings status. Table 4, columns 3
and 4 report that the coefficient on the interaction term CCQUAL*∆ROE is positive and
significant (t = 3.84, p < .001). This supports H1 and provides evidence that CEO cash
compensation is more closely aligned to accounting earnings when compensation
committee quality is high. Table 4, columns 5 and 6 report that the coefficients on the
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interaction terms lnMB*CCQUAL*∆ROE and LOSS*CCQUAL*∆ROE are negative and
significant (t = -1.77, p < .05 and t = -1.52, p < .10, respectively), consistent with H2 and
H3. These results suggest that the effect of compensation committee quality on the
association between CEO cash compensation and accounting earnings is less positive for
high growth firms and loss-making firms than for low growth firms and profit-making
firms. Our findings also suggest that the effectiveness of compensation committees
would be lower for high growth firms, consistent with the argument that those firms may
have lower corporate governance quality (Bathala and Rao, 1995; Linck, Netter, Yang,
2008).
Take in Table 4
We conduct several additional analyses to examine whether the results on the
effect of overall compensation committee quality on the association between CEO cash
compensation and accounting performance and the moderating effects of growth
opportunities and earnings status are robust. First, we examine whether the results are
sensitive to using an alternative measure of accounting earnings. Table 5 provides the
results when ROE is replaced with ROA. The coefficient on the interaction term
CCQUAL*∆ROA is positive and significant (t = 3.28, p < .001), which is again
consistent with H1. The coefficients on the interaction terms lnMB*CCQUAL*∆ROA
and LOSS*CCQUAL*∆ROA are negative and significant (t = -1.95, p < .05 and
t = -1.88, p < .05, respectively), which also supports H2 and H3.
Take in Table 5
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Second, we examine whether the results are robust after including several control
variables in the regression model. Based on Leone, Wu, and Zimmerman (2006), models
(2) and (3) are expanded as follows:
∆ln(COMP) = δ0 +δ1 CCQUAL +δ2 ∆ROE+δ3 CCQUAL*∆ROE + δ4 RET
+ δ5 lnMB+ δ6 lnMB*∆ROE + δ7 SALES + δ8 SALES2 + δ9 LEV
+δ10LEV*∆ROE + δ11 ln(COMP-1) + industry dummies

(4)

∆ln(COMP) = δ0 +δ1 CCQUAL +δ2 ∆ROE+δ3 CCQUAL*∆ROE + δ4 RET
+ δ5 lnMB+ δ6 lnMB*∆ROE + δ7 lnMB*CCQUAL*∆ROE + δ8 LOSS
+ δ9 LOSS*∆ROE + δ10 LOSS*CCQUAL*∆ROE +δ11 SALES
+ δ12 SALES2 + δ13 LEV +δ14LEV*∆ROE + δ15 ln(COMP-1)
+ industry dummies

(5)

Following Leone, Wu, and Zimmerman (2006), we include SALES and SALES2
to control for potential non-linear size effects. We also add lnMB, LEV, and the
interaction terms lnMB*∆ROE and LEV*∆ROE in model (4) as control variables
because they may affect the pay-performance sensitivity (Leone, Wu, and Zimmerman,
2006). In addition, we include the prior year’s cash compensation in the models as we
use change in cash compensation as the dependent variable.
Table 6 provides the results of the regression that examines the effect of overall
compensation committee quality on the association between CEO cash compensation and
accounting earnings and the moderating effects of growth opportunities and earnings
status after including the control variables. We find that after controlling for these
variables, the coefficient on the interaction term CCQUAL*∆ROE remains positive and

25

significant (t = 4.05, p < .001), consistent with H1. The coefficients on the interaction
terms lnMB*CCQUAL*∆ROE and LOSS*CCQUAL*∆ROE also remain negative and
significant (t = -1.87, p < .05 and t = -1.67, p < .05, respectively), consistent with H2 and
H3.
Take in Table 6
Third, the governance quality of the compensation committee may not be an
exogenous variable. The compensation committee characteristics may be affected by
CEO compensation and its association with firm performance. To control for this
potential endogeneity, we use a two-stage regression procedure similar to a procedure
used by Frankel, Kothari, and Weber (2006). We expect that the demand for high
compensation committee governance quality will depend on the CEO’s influence,
substitute monitoring mechanisms, and the firm’s growth opportunities and size. Thus,
the first stage regression model is as follows:
CCQUAL = ρ0 + ρ1CEOOWN + ρ2CEOTEN + ρ3INSHD + ρ 4lnMB
+ ρ5FSIZE + ρ6CCQUALRANK

(6)

CEOOWN and CEOTEN are included because prior research suggests that board
governance quality is lower for firms with high CEO influence (Bathala and Rao, 1995;
Baker and Gompers, 2003; Kieschnick and Moussawi, 2004). Since there could be a
substitute relation between institutional shareholdings and other monitoring mechanisms
(Brickley, Lease, and Smith, 1988; Agrawal and Mandelker, 1990; Rediker and Seth,
1995), we include INSHD. We include lnMB because prior studies find that high growth
firms have low board governance quality (Bathala and Rao, 1995; Linck, Netter, Yang,
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2008). FSIZE is also included as prior research argues that large firms have more agency
conflicts between managers and shareholders, resulting in a high demand for corporate
governance quality (Barclay and Smith, 1995a; 1995b).
CCQUAL in the second stage regressions (i.e., models (2) and (3)) is the fitted
value from the first stage regression (i.e., model (6)).9 Table 7 provides the results on
testing the hypotheses after allowing for the potential endogeneity of corporate
governance quality. The results of the second stage regressions show that the coefficient
on the interaction term CCQUAL*∆ROE is still positive and significant (t = 4.01,
p < .001), and that the coefficients on the interaction terms lnMB*CCQUAL*∆ROE and
LOSS*CCQUAL*∆ROE are still negative and significant (t = -2.39, p < .01 and
t = -1.87, p < .05, respectively), which supports H1, H2, and H3 after controlling for the
endogeneity issue.
Take in Table 7

CONCLUSION
This study investigates the effect of compensation committee quality on the role of
accounting performance in CEO cash compensation contracts. Specifically, we examine
whether compensation committee quality affects the association between CEO cash
compensation and earnings performance and whether the effect of compensation
committee quality on the association between CEO cash compensation and earnings
performance varies among firms. Unlike prior research that focuses on compensation
committee independence, we identify the five compensation committee characteristics –
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other than committee independence – to comprehensively measure compensation
committee quality.
Using a sample of 812 U.S. listed companies with fully independent
compensation committees, we document that CEO cash compensation is more positively
associated with accounting earnings for firms with high compensation committee
governance quality than for firms with low compensation committee governance quality.
We also find that the positive effect of compensation committee quality on the
association between CEO cash compensation and earnings performance is weakened by
growth opportunities and loss-making. Our results are robust to using an alternative
earnings measure, adding control variables, and allowing for the endogeneity of
governance quality.
Like any study, we recognize that our study has certain limitations. First, our
study is limited to the U.S. data. It is unclear whether our results can be generalized to
other countries’ contexts. Future research may examine the effect of compensation
committee quality on CEO compensation using international data. Second, it is possible
that other compensation committee characteristics – in addition, to the ones considered
here – might also affect compensation committee quality. Future research may develop
composite measures of compensation committee quality by adding other committee
characteristics to those used in this study.
Nonetheless, this study has theoretical and practical implications. For example,
we add to the agency theory based literature on CEO compensation in several ways.
First, while prior studies find that CEO cash compensation is positively associated with
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accounting earnings (e.g., Lambert and Larcker, 1987; Sloan, 2003), we extend this line
of research by directly examining whether the governance quality of the compensation
committee has an impact on this relation. Second, we also consider whether the impact
of compensation committee quality on CEO cash compensation contracts varies in crosssection. We find the impact of compensation committee quality on the CEO cash
compensation-performance relation is weaker for high growth firms or loss-making
firms. Third, in contrast to prior studies in this area (e.g., Anderson and Bizjak, 2003;
Newman and Mozes, 1999; Vafeas, 2003a), we use a comprehensive measure of
compensation committee quality. Thus, our research contributes to the prior agency
theory based literature by providing a richer understanding of the role of compensation
committees in writing effective compensation contracts for CEOs.
From the perspective of practice, our findings have implications at several levels.
As an example, our results suggest that shareholders and directors should be concerned
about the overall quality of compensation committees. Specifically, we find that
compensation committee quality depends on compensation committee size and whether
the committee includes CEO-appointed directors, senior directors, experienced directors
(i.e., directors with additional directorships), and the CEO. For compensation committee
members, our results imply that there are greater challenges in monitoring compensation
contracts for firms with high growth or that incur losses. In such cases, committee
members need to improve their monitoring or design contracts that rely less on cash
compensation (e.g., stock based compensation). For policymakers, our findings indicate
that even when all compensation committees are regulated to be fully independent (i.e.,
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all compensation committee members are outside directors), there are still quality
differences among these independent compensation committees. Thus, if policymakers
continue to have concerns about the effectiveness of compensation committees, they may
need to introduce specific requirements related to the overall quality of these committees
(e.g., requiring that members have multiple directorships).
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Table 1
The Association between CEO Cash Compensation and Accounting Earnings

Variable

Predicted Sign

Coefficient

Intercept

t-statistic

0.03

0.69

∆ROE

+

0.46

6.69***

RET

+

0.18

6.45***

Industry dummies

Included

N

812

F-statistic

6.30***
2

Adjusted R

15.00%

Model :
∆ln(COMP) = β0 + β1 ∆ROE+ β2 RET + industry dummies
∆ln(COMP): Change in CEO cash compensation, measured by the change in the log value of
CEO salary plus bonus.
∆ROE: Change in ROE, ROE is measured by income before extraordinary items divided by the
beginning-year shareholders’ equity.
RET: Stock returns, measured by the buy-hold returns based on monthly returns for a fiscal year.
*** p < .001 (one-tailed).
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Table 2
The Effect of Compensation Committee Characteristics on the Association between
CEO Cash Compensation and Accounting Earnings
Panel A
CEO Appointed Directors

Variable

Predicted
Sign

Intercept
CCQUAL_measure
∆ROE

+

t-statistic

CEO Directors

Coefficient

t-statistic

Coefficient

t-statistic

0.02

0.54

0.04

1.11

0.05

1.22

0.01

0.18

-0.14

-1.41†

-0.07

-1.16

0.59

5.55***

-0.29

CCQUAL_measure*∆ROE
RET

Coefficient

Senior Directors

0.18

Industry dummies

-1.57†
6.46***

0.40

5.62***

0.36

4.29***

1.73

3.28***

0.55

1.90*

0.18

6.52***

0.18

6.42***

Included

N

Included

812

Included

812

812

F-statistic

5.96***

6.50***

6.07***

Adjusted R2

15.06%

16.43%

15.36%

Panel B
Director Shareholdings

Variable

Predicted
Sign

Intercept
CCQUAL_measure
∆ROE
CCQUAL_measure*∆ROE
RET
Industry dummies

+

Additional Directorships

Committee Size

Coefficient

t-statistic

Coefficient

t-statistic

Coefficient

t-statistic

0.03

0.70

0.04

0.92

0.08

1.45†

-0.09

0.46

-0.03

-0.63

-0.02

-1.38†

0.45

6.01***

0.31

3.33***

0.74

0.62

0.46

0.47

2.37**

-0.08

0.18

6.46***

0.18

6.27***

0.18

Included

35

Included

3.47***
-1.40†
6.45***

Included

N

812

F-statistic

5.86***
2

Adjusted R

14.81%

812

812

6.11***

5.99***

15.46%

Model:
∆ln(COMP) = γ0 + γ1CCQUAL_measure + γ2 ∆ROE + γ3CCQUAL_measure*∆ROE + γ4 RET
+ industry dummies
(2)
where CCQUAL_measure is an individual compensation committee governance quality measure.
The other variables are defined in Table 1.
†
p < .10 (one-tailed).
* p < .05 (one-tailed).
** p < .01 (one-tailed).
*** p < .001 (one-tailed).
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15.06%

Table 3
Descriptive Statistics and Pearson Correlations
Panel A: Descriptive statistics
N

Mean

Median

Std Dev

Q1

Q3

CCQUAL
∆ln(COMP)
∆ROE

Variable

812
812
812

2.08
0.05
-0.01

2.00
0.07
-0.01

1.13
0.44
0.22

1.00
-0.17
-0.07

3.00
0.24
0.04

RET
lnMB

812
812

0.28
0.51

0.23
0.38

0.58
0.51

-0.11
0.12

0.56
0.85

LOSS

812

0.14

0.00

0.34

0.00

0.00

Panel B: Pearson correlations
CCQUAL
CCQUAL

∆ROE

RET

-0.01

†

1.00

∆ROE
RET

-0.07

1.00

0.30***
1.00

lnMB
LOSS

lnMB
-0.04

LOSS
-0.00

0.10**
0.28***

-0.24***
-0.22***

1.00

-0.14***
1.00

CCQUAL: Composite measure of compensation committee governance quality based on the aggregate
quality scores of the five compensation committee characteristics.
lnMB: Growth opportunities measured the log of the sum of book value of liabilities and market value of
common equity over book value of assets.
LOSS: Loss-making dummy coded “1” for loss-making firms and “0” otherwise.

The other variables are defined in Table 1.
†
p < .10 (two-tailed).
** p < .01 (two-tailed).
*** p < .001 (two-tailed).
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Table 4
The Effect of Overall Compensation Committee Quality on the Association
between CEO Cash Compensation and Accounting Earnings
Model (2)
Variable

Predicted
Sign

Coefficient

t-statistic
1.42†

-1.09

-0.01

-1.01

0.05

0.39

0.02

0.10

0.07

CCQUAL

-0.01

1.49†

Coefficient
0.07

Intercept

∆ROE

t-statistic

Model (3)

CCQUAL*∆ROE

+

0.23

3.84***

0.43

4.24***

RET

+

0.18

6.37***

0.18

6.05***

lnMB

-0.02

-0.57

lnMB*∆ROE

0.11

0.55

-0.18

-1.77*

LOSS

-0.04

-0.79

LOSS*∆ROE

-0.12

-0.48

-0.20

-1.52†

lnMB*CCQUAL*∆ROE

LOSS*CCQUAL*∆ROE

-

-

Industry dummies

Included

N

812

F-statistic
Adjusted R2

6.54***
16.54%

Included
812
6.01***
17.77%

Models:
∆ln(COMP) = γ0 + γ1 CCQUAL + γ2 ∆ROE + γ3CCQUAL*∆ROE + γ4 RET + industry dummies
∆ln(COMP) = γ0 + γ1 CCQUAL + γ2 ∆ROE + γ3CCQUAL*∆ROE + γ4 RET + γ5 lnMB
+ γ6 lnMB*∆ROE+ γ7 lnMB*CCQUAL*∆ROE + γ8 LOSS + γ9 LOSS*∆ROE
+ γ10 LOSS*CCQUAL*∆ROE + industry dummies
The variables are defined in Tables 1 and 3.
†
p < .10 (one-tailed).
* p < .05 (one-tailed).
*** p < .001 (one-tailed).
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(2)

(3)

Table 5
The Effect of Overall Compensation Committee Quality on the Association
between CEO Cash Compensation and Accounting Earnings Measured by ROA
Model (2)
Variable

Predicted
Sign

Coefficient

t-statistic
1.82*

-0.97

-0.01

-0.55

0.08

0.25

0.20

0.19

0.07

CCQUAL

-0.01

1.47†

Coefficient
0.08

Intercept

∆ROA

t-statistic

Model (3)

CCQUAL*∆ROA

+

0.51

3.28***

1.80

3.78***

RET

+

0.18

6.34***

0.17

5.41***

lnMB

-0.02

-0.65

lnMB*∆ROA

0.53

0.52

-0.93

-1.95*

LOSS

-0.01

-0.09

LOSS*∆ROA

0.49

0.41

-1.01

-1.88*

lnMB*CCQUAL*∆ROA

LOSS*CCQUAL*∆ROA

-

-

Industry dummies

Included

N

812

F-statistic
Adjusted R2

5.91***
14.93%

Included
812
5.98***
17.70%

Models:
∆ln(COMP) = γ0 + γ1 CCQUAL + γ2 ∆ROA + γ3CCQUAL*∆ROA + γ4 RET + industry dummies
∆ln(COMP) = γ0 + γ1 CCQUAL + γ2 ∆ROA + γ3CCQUAL*∆ROA + γ4 RET + γ5 lnMB
+ γ6 lnMB*∆ROA+ γ7 lnMB*CCQUAL*∆ROEA+ γ8 LOSS + γ9 LOSS*∆ROA
+ γ10 LOSS*CCQUAL*∆ROA + industry dummies
The variables are defined in Tables 1 and 2.
†
p < .10 (one-tailed).
* p < .05 (one-tailed).
*** p < .001 (one-tailed).
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Table 6
The Effect of Overall Compensation Committee Quality on the Association
between CEO Cash Compensation and Accounting Earnings after Adding
Several Control Variables
Model (2)
Variable

Predicted
Sign

Coefficient

Model (3)

t-statistic

Coefficient

t-statistic

Intercept

0.41

1.23

0.47

1.41†

CCQUAL

-0.01

-0.91

-0.01

-0.82

0.20

1.33†

0.11

0.57

∆ROE
CCQUAL*∆ROE

+

0.25

4.05***

0.45

4.35***

RET

+

0.18

6.12***

0.18

5.92***

lnMB

-0.02

-0.51

-0.01

-0.38

lnMB*∆ROE

-0.16

-1.43†

0.13

0.65

-0.19

-1.87*

LOSS

-0.06

-1.25

LOSS*∆ROE

-0.14

-0.52

-0.22

-1.67*

lnMB*CCQUAL*∆ROE

LOSS*CCQUAL*∆ROE

-

-

SALES

0.04

0.46

0.02

0.27

SALES2

-0.00

-0.34

-0.00

-0.17

LEV

-0.06

-0.55

-0.06

-0.55

LEV*∆ROE

-0.25

-0.80

-0.473

-1.50†

ln(COMP-1)

-0.07

-4.56***

-0.076

-4.74***

Industry dummies

Included

N

812

F-statistic
Adjusted R2

6.15***
18.60%
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Included
812
6.09***
20.06%

Models:
∆ln(COMP) = δ0 +δ1 CCQUAL +δ2 ∆ROE+δ3 CCQUAL*∆ROE + δ4 RET + δ5 lnMB
+ δ6 lnMB*∆ROE + δ7 SALES + δ8 SALES2 + δ9 LEV+δ10LEV*∆ROE + δ11 ln(COMP-1)
+ industry dummies
(4)
∆ln(COMP) = δ0 +δ1 CCQUAL +δ2 ∆ROE+δ3 CCQUAL*∆ROE + δ4 RET + δ5 lnMB
+ δ6 lnMB*∆ROE + δ7 lnMB*CCQUAL*∆ROE + δ8 LOSS + δ9 LOSS*∆ROE
+ δ10 LOSS*CCQUAL*∆ROE +δ11 SALES + δ12 SALES2 + δ13 LEV +δ14LEV*∆ROE
+ δ15 ln(COMP-1) + industry dummies
(5)
SALES: Sales, measured by the log value of net sales.
LEV: Leverage, measured by the debt-to-assets ratio.
ln(COMP-1): Prior year’s cash compensation, the log value of prior year’s CEO salary plus
bonus.
The other variables are defined in Tables 1 and 3.
†
p < .10 (one-tailed).
* p < .05 (one-tailed).
*** p < .001 (one-tailed).
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Table 7
Two-Stage Regressions for the Effect of Overall Compensation Committee
Quality on the Association between CEO Cash Compensation and Accounting
Earnings
Model (2)
Variable

Predicted
Sign

Coefficient

t-statistic

Model (3)
Coefficient

t-statistic

Intercept

0.04

0.87

0.04

0.91

CCQUAL

-0.01

-0.35

-0.01

-0.40

∆ROE

-0.01

-0.05

-0.19

-0.86

CCQUAL*∆ROE

+

0.26

4.01***

0.54

4.48***

RET

+

0.19

6.51***

0.19

6.20***

lnMB

-0.03

-0.79

lnMB*∆ROE

0.31

1.34†

-0.29

-2.39**

LOSS

-0.05

-1.05

LOSS*∆ROE

-0.03

-0.09

-0.27

-1.87*

lnMB*CCQUAL*∆ROE

LOSS*CCQUAL*∆ROE

-

-

Industry dummies

Included

N

774

F-statistic
Adjusted R2

6.15***
16.18%

Included
774
5.69***
17.53%

Model (first-stage):
CCQUAL = ρ0 + ρ1CEOOWN + ρ2CEOTEN + ρ3INSHD + ρ 4lnMB + ρ5FSIZE
+ ρ6CCQUALRANK
(6)
CEOOWN: CEO ownership, measured by the percentage of shares owned by the CEO,
CEOTEN: CEO tenure, measured by the number of years for which the incumbent CEO has been the
CEO of the firm.
INSHD: Institutional shareholding, measured by the percentage of shares owned by institutional
investors.
FSIZE: Firm size, measured by the log of total assets.
CCQUALRANK: 0, 1 or 2 based on portfolio rank when sorted by CCQUAL.
Models (second-stage):
∆ln(COMP) = γ0 + γ1 CCQUAL + γ2 ∆ROE + γ3CCQUAL*∆ROE + γ4 RET + industry dummies (2)
∆ln(COMP) = γ0 + γ1 CCQUAL + γ2 ∆ROE + γ3RCQUAL*∆ROE + γ4 RET + γ5 lnMB
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+ γ6 lnMB*∆ROE+ γ7 lnMB*CCQUAL*∆ROE + γ8 LOSS + γ9 LOSS*∆ROE
+ γ10 LOSS*CCQUAL*∆ROE + industry dummies
The other variables are defined in Tables 1 and 3.
†
p < .10 (one-tailed).
* p < .05 (one-tailed).
** p < .01 (one-tailed).
*** p < .001 (one-tailed).
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1

The 1992 SEC compensation disclosure rules (i.e., Executive Compensation Disclosure,
Release No. 33-6962) stipulated that U.S. listed companies must disclose a summary table including all
forms of compensation, a comparison of pay and stock performance, and an explanation for incentive
compensation by the compensation committee. The requirement of enhancing compensation disclosure
encouraged more independent directors to sit on the compensation committee to signal adequate quality
of compensation committees. Internal Revenue Code Section 162(m) stipulated that compensation
expense over a million dollars for any of the five highest-paid executives is not tax deductible unless
compensation is performance-based. One of the conditions on which compensation is treated as
performance-based is that “the performance goals are determined by a compensation committee of the
board of directors of the taxpayer which is comprised solely of 2 or more outside directors”. Vafeas
(2003a) assumes that compensation committee independence was enhanced by these regulatory
changes.
2
While we adopt an agency theory approach, as Bender (2007) suggests, expectancy theory is
an alternative theoretical lens that can be used to examine executive compensation schemes.
3
Anderson and Bizjak (2003) document that inside directors held 13.0% of the seats on the
compensation committee in the pre-regulation period (1985-1993) and 4.8% in the post-regulation
(1994-1998).
4
A going-concern report is an auditor report that the client will not be able to continuously
operate in the foreseeable future.
5
We use 2001 data to avoid the confounding effects of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002 (SOX).
Specifically, SOX introduced significant changes to the corporate governance environment in the US.
Thus, if we rely on data from the post-SOX period, it would be hard to untangle the SOX effects from
the effects due solely to compensation committee quality.
6
Since other directorships in IRRC Directors are only limited to the universe of IRRC firms, we
review proxy statements to collect directors’ other directorships in all companies.
7
Similar results are obtained if finance firms are excluded from the full sample.
8
These six compensation committee characteristics are identified by two criteria: (1) Theoretical
arguments and empirical evidence suggest that they could be governance quality measures, and (2)
related data are included in proxy statements.
9
We add CCQUALRANK in the first stage model because this crude measure can capture the
level of CCQUAL but not the variation in CCQUAL, and thus can be used as an instrumental variable
(e.g., Greene, 2000; Hentschel and Kothari, 2001).
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